Unequal Civilian Accommodation within Democratic Rule: The Case of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province after the Government–LTTE Conflict by Fathurrahman, Izzan & Kartini, Evida
Unequal Civilian Accommodation within 
Democratic Rule: The Case of Sri Lanka’s Northern 
Province after the Government–LTTE Conflict 
I Z Z A N  F A T H U R R A H M A N *
Development Studies Programme, Graduate School, Lund University
Sandgatan 13A, Lund 22100
Sweden
E V I D A  K A R T I N I * *
Department of Political Science, University of Indonesia




Tulisan ini menganalisis hubungan sipil-militer Provinsi Utara Sri Lanka pasca konflik 
antara pemerintah Sri Lanka dan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) tahun 2009 
berdasarkan pemikiran Alfred Stepan serta David Pion-Berlin dan Harold Trinkunas. 
Stepan menjelaskan dua dimensi yang mempengaruhi hubungan sipil-militer, yaitu 
dimensi kontestasi militer dan dimensi hak istimewa militer. Analisis dari dua dimensi 
tersebut menunjukkan adanya hubungan sipil-militer dengan akomodasi sipil yang 
tidak seimbang di Provinsi Utara Sri Lanka. Temuan ini sejalan dengan teori yang dike-
mukakan oleh Pion-Berlin dan Trinkunas bahwa dalam keadaan krisis yang tinggi dan 
kontrol sipil yang lemah, militer memiliki peran domestik yang ekstensif dan melakukan 
intervensi. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dan menerapkan teknik 
studi literatur dan analisis dokumen.
Kata kunci: Hubungan sipil-militer, LTTE, militer, Sri Lanka, Provinsi Utara
ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the civil-military relations in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province after the 
2009 conflict between the central government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) by drawing upon the theories of Alfred Stepan and David Pion-Berlin and Harold 
Trinkunas. Stepan posited that there were two dimensions that shaped civil-military 
relationships: military contestation and prerogatives. This study’s analysis of these 
two dimensions in the case of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province shows that the civil-mili-
tary relationship in the region takes shape in the unequal civilian accommodation 
type. This analysis corresponds to Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas’ theory that high levels 
of crisis coupled with weak civilian control would pave the way for the military to take 
on extensive domestic roles and intervene in civilian affairs. This research employs 
a qualitative method through the examination of existing literature and documents. 
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, Sri Lanka’s Northern Province was ridden by ethnic con-
flict between the majority Sinhalese and the Tamil minority. In 1974, 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil 
Tigers, began launching series of attacks as a response to the discrimina-
tion against the Tamil. The LTTE terrorized the central government 
in Colombo and made the Eastern and Northern Province the basis 
of their movement. After several decades, the Sri Lankan government-
LTTE conflict finally came to a ceasefire after the LTTE leader, Ve-
lupillai Prabahakaran, was killed in the 2009 war (International Crisis 
Group 2012a, 4; hereafter ICG). 
During the conflict, the Eastern and Northern Provinces suffered 
heavy destruction, with their economic infrastructure experiencing 
some of the worst. As a response, the democratic Sri Lankan govern-
ment launched a series of post-conflict reconstruction and reconcili-
ation programs in the Northern Province with the military’s support. 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa formed the Presidential Task Force 
(PTF), which was supposed to be under the control of the Minister of 
Economic Development, Basil Rajapaksa, and to work in cooperation 
with the military commanders in the Northern Province (ICG 2011, 
14).
The involvement of the military in this restoration project was in-
tended to make the reconstruction and reconciliation programs in 
the province more effective and efficient. The military involvement 
in reconstruction and reconciliation efforts is nothing new for many 
countries and organizations, particularly for non-combat military op-
erations. These non-combat military operations consist of various non-
war internal missions, such as national development, internal security, 
humanitarian aid, and social welfare projects (Desch 2001, 18). 
The main reason to deploy the military in non-combat operations is 
the military’s capacity to complement the civilian government, particu-
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larly in areas where the latter is much weaker. Military personnel and 
units are capable of incorporating communication, construction, educa-
tion, healthcare, professional, or transportation training in their non-
combat operations. In addition, many social benefits could be widely 
received from their involvement (Goodman 2001, 45). The military’s 
comparative advantage in terms of organizational discipline and provi-
sion of security and technical capacity in the efficient distribution of 
logistics could fulfill the need for organizational or civilian authority 
in the short-term (Franke 2006, 18). 
However, the military’s entanglement in domestic affairs must be 
done with caution, paying close attention to the division of roles be-
tween the civilian authority and the military. During crises, the role 
of the military should be mainly temporary but effective in supporting 
the needs of the civilian authority (Franke 2006, 16). Long-term roles, 
particularly cultural and deeply rooted roles in society, must be held 
by the civilian authority or humanitarian organizations (Franke 2006). 
In assessing the dynamics of civil-military relations, Alfred Stepan 
(1998, 100–108) emphasized the analysis of two variables, military con-
testation and prerogatives. Stepan based his analysis on the Brazilian 
and Latin American context after the democratic transitions in the 
1980s (Eldem 2019, 4). One of his findings showed that low military 
contestation coupled with strong military prerogatives would result in 
an unequal civilian accommodation type of civil-military relationship 
(Stepan 1998, 135). 
Stepan’s (1998) analysis corresponds to that of Pion-Berlin and 
Trinkunas’ (2005), who inquired into civil-military relationships from 
the perspectives of crisis and civilian control. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 
(2005, 13) argued that intense military involvement in times of crisis 
when the civilian authority was weak allowed the military to intervene 
in policymaking. In this regard, the military tends to intervene not 
because of its natural desire to dominate internal affairs, but rather 
because the civilian government lacks the capacity to run their tasks; 
this condition paves the way for the military to take up the roles of the 
weak civilian authority (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2005). 
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This study aims to analyze the civil-military relationship, particularly 
the unequal civilian accommodation, in the post-conflict Northern 
Province of Sri Lanka using a combination of Stepan’s (1998) and Pion-
Berlin and Trinkunas’ (2005) theories. The research question that this 
study seeks to answer is, “what did the unequal civilian accommoda-
tion type of civil-military relationship look like in post-conflict Sri 
Lanka’s Northern Province?” From a theoretical perspective, this study 
does not aspire to test Stepan’s analysis. It mainly suggests that Stepan’s 
theory, combined with that of Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas’, may help 
us in assessing the military influence in a civilian governance in non-
political contexts, such as the reconstruction and reconciliation process 
in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. 
This paper is structured into five sections: introduction, theoreti-
cal framework, research methods, discussion, and conclusion. More 
specifically, the discussion begins with an outline of the post-conflict 
Northern Province as a contextual background, an explanation on the 
military contestation and prerogatives dimensions proposed by Stepan 
(1998) as this study’s theoretical framework, followed by an analysis of 
civil-military relationship that emerges as a result of the interaction of 
these two dimensions. The Northern Province’s case feeds into the 
analysis and helps explain the consequence of civil-military relations 
in democratic governments due to the granting of extensive control to 
the military during a crisis. 
THEOR ETICA L FR A MEWOR K
The studies of civil-military relations inquire into the power relations 
between civilian governments and the military in shaping a state’s po-
litical system. This field has a long history and has been heavily based 
on the democratic transitions in Latin America after the third wave. 
Theories of civil-military relations in Latin America have been widely 
adopted to analyze similar phenomena in other regions, such as South 
Asia and Southeast Asia (see, for example, Crouch 1999 and Shah 2013). 
Scholars like Samuel E. Finer (2002) have outlined two factors shap-
ing the opportunities for the military to intervene in a civilian rule: 
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situations in which the civilian government becomes dependent on the 
military authority and when the popularity of the military sidelines that 
of the civilian authority. Michael C. Desch (2001, 18) emphasized the 
military’s mission, whether internal or external, as a factor affecting the 
relationship between the civilian government and the military. Good-
man (2001) posited that evaluation of the effectiveness of the military’s 
mission also mattered. The legitimacy of the military authority in social 
welfare provision, for example, is seen to be appropriate in situations 
where there are no other non-military institutions capable of carrying 
out these affairs (Goodman 2001, 56). 
Studies of civil-military relations have also been contextualized to 
adapt to the contemporary democratic context. The involvement of the 
military in Indonesia’s handling of the COVID-19, for example, has 
shown that caution is needed to avoid abuse of power and breach of ad-
ministrational structure (Fahrizal 2020, 5). For countries with low levels 
of resilience, the extensive participation of the military into governance 
during a crisis without strong civilian leadership and responsiveness is 
bound to lead to the weakening of civilian control and the strengthen-
ing of military authority (Graham 2020). Thus, types of civil-military 
relationships could be predictors for democratic quality (Cole 1992, 22).
This study stems from Alfred Stepan’s (1998) analysis of the Brazil-
ian context after the third wave. Stepan (1998) posited that there were 
two dimensions that influenced the form of civil-military relationships: 
military contestation and prerogatives. The interaction between the 
dimensions shapes the type of civil-military relationship in a certain 
country (Eldem 2019, 4). 
The military contestation dimension refers to open military contesta-
tion in opposition to the policies of the civilian authorities. The level of 
military contestation is highly dependent on the extent of fundamental 
differences or disagreements between the military and the civilian gov-
ernment on vital issues. These vital issues comprise of 1) the legacy of 
human rights violations; 2) military budget; and 3) the military’s mis-
sion, organization, and structure as well as the civilian government’s 
control over the military (Stepan 1998, 100–118). 
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The legacy of human rights violations pertains to the proportion 
of responses made by the military institution and civilian authorities 
towards human rights violations committed by the former. The civilian 
government’s response to these violations will push the military to shield 
themselves after the transition phase. This particular reaction occurs 
when the government seeks to investigate the military’s violations and 
criminalize the military elites (Stanley 2001, 73). 
The military budget is a civilian government’s policy pertaining to 
the maintenance, increase, or decrease of the military budget. This 
policy includes the supply of weaponry. Meanwhile, the military’s mis-
sion, organization, and structure as well as the civilian authorities’ con-
trol over the military refer to the disagreements between the civilian 
government and military pertaining to the formulation of a mission, 
structure of, or control over a new military institution. Conflicts be-
tween the civilian government and the military will heighten when the 
civilian government seeks to shape the military’s mission and establish 
a strong mechanism of control. The initiation of such a policy will be 
perceived as a threat to the military institution. 
Military contestation is regarded as low when no conflict between 
the military and civilian government arises from the three vital issues 
mentioned above (Cole 1992, 20). This dimension, however, is not suf-
ficient on its own in determining the type of civil-military relationship 
that emerges; it must be assessed along with the prerogatives held by the 
military. Low levels of military contestation, for example, are not always 
coupled with similarly low levels of military prerogatives (Cole 1992). 
Military prerogatives are defined as the civilian government’s atti-
tudes towards the military institution, whether its presence is opposed, 
whether the military has privileges, and whether these privileges apply 
in a formal nature. Military prerogatives affect the military’s capabil-
ity to assert control over the civilian government, intervene into the 
civilian authority, and take up roles outside of the military profession, 
such as the defense sector or even the shaping of the relations between 
the state and the political and civil society (Cole 1992, 127). Military 
prerogatives are high when the military is able to increase its capacity 
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in these issues—de facto or de jure—without being subject to substantial 
opposition (Shah 2013, 1019).
Low military contestation and high military prerogatives are argued 
to lead to unequal civilian accommodation. A nation-state in such a 
condition is vulnerable because the military forces claim that their 
control over many prerogatives is legitimate. As a result, the processes 
of policy formulation and implementation are likely to be conflictual. 
Military institutions with strong support from the civil and political 
society are capable of using their prerogatives to impose decisions upon 
the democratic government, against which the latter has very little 
means to refuse if it wishes to avoid a coup (Stepan 1998, 135). In such 
a context, civil-military relationships of the unequal civilian accom-
modation type could serve as a middle way towards a more democratic 
system (Cole 1992, 21). 
Stepan’s argument is in line with that of Pion-Berlin and Trinku-
nas’ (2005). Looking into the cases of Latin American countries, they 
outlined four quadrants based on the intensity of the crisis and civilian 
control (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2005, 12). In the first quadrant is 
the condition in which a high level of crisis is coupled with strong civil-
ian control; this condition results in an extensive role of the military in 
internal affairs but without any interventions. An example of this case is 
Argentina in 2000–2003. The second quadrant is the condition where 
the crisis is high and civilian control is absent, leading to an extensive 
role of the military in internal affairs but with intervention. This condi-
tion occurred in Venezuela in 2002. The third quadrant is where the 
crisis is low, but the civilian control is high, leading to a constrained 
military involvement in internal affairs. Military intervention is unlikely 
in such a condition. Argentina in 1991–2000 is an example of this case. 
In the fourth quadrant, both the levels of crisis and civilian control are 
low, resulting in a moderate level of military control in internal affairs 
without any interventions. 
Out of these four quadrants, military intervention and their domina-
tion in internal affairs occur in conditions where crisis is high while the 
civilian authority is weak. The military is likely to intervene in civilian 
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governance, not because of its inherent interests to dominate internal 
affairs but rather because of the inadequacy of the civilian authority, 
leaving room for the military to fill in (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2005, 
13). The vacuum of power and weak control over military activities in 
domestic issues, coupled with the support from the political elites and 
ongoing conflicts, allow the military to take up positions that cater to 
their interests (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2005). 
This study draws upon Stepan’s (1998) theory of the two dimensions 
of civil-military relationships, conjoined with Pion-Berlin and Trinku-
nas’ (2005) theory, to explain the unequal civil accommodation type of 
civil-military relationship in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. Although 
Stepan’s and Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas’ studies were based on the 
Brazilian and Latin American context after the third wave, we argue 
that the theory is applicable to analyze the case of Sri Lanka’s Northern 
Province. These two theories are used to simplify the complex dynam-
ics of military involvement in reconstruction and reconciliation in the 
post-crisis period in North Sri Lanka through comprehensive analysis. 
R ESEA RCH METHODS
This study employs a qualitative method. Qualitative methods are suit-
able to gauge in-depth data pertaining to phenomena and behavior, 
allowing us to make sense of social behavior and various contexts (de 
Vaus 2002, 5). Qualitative research is commonly carried out in projects 
seeking to analyze social structures, behavior, and culture (Ritchie et 
al. 2003, 25). This characteristic is appropriate for this study as it aims 
to explore the unequal civilian accommodation type of civil-military 
relationship in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. This mode of research 
would help reveal the effects or consequences of a policy or decision 
and the causes underlying such outcomes (Ritchie et al. 2003). 
Qualitative research prioritizes rich and in-depth data on social and 
political phenomena. This study primarily looks at secondary data; it 
draws upon existing literature and documents. Document analysis is 
carried out to gather information as well as delve further into the mean-
ings of the messages contained in the analyzed documents (Ritchie et 
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al. 2003, 35). The documents analyzed in this study are reports written 
by NGOs, previous studies on the topic, government documents and 
statements, as well as news covering the phenomenon in question. We 
employ a case study method to reach a holistic understanding of the 
studied political phenomenon (Mason 2018, 209). The in-depth and 
holistic analysis of the Northern Province case will help make sense of 
civil-military relationships in similar settings.
DISCUSSION
This section is divided into four parts. First, we delve into the context 
of the Northern Province after the 2009 conflict. The second and third 
parts look into the two dimensions laid out in our theoretical frame-
work: the military prerogatives dimension and military contestation di-
mension. Then, we analyze how these two dimensions resulted in an 
unequal civilian accommodation type of civil-military relationship in 
the Northern Province. 
Context: Civilian Rule in the Post-
Conf lict Northern Province
The weak capacity of a democratic civilian rule often opens room for 
the military to intervene and extend its control (Pion-Berlin and Trinku-
nas 2005, 13). Reflecting upon Sri Lanka’s Northern Province’s case, the 
failure of the civilian rule in the region resulted in complex problems 
that paved the way for the military to intervene and take over the gover-
nance of internal affairs. These problems included refugees and victims 
of war, the destruction of the region’s infrastructure, unemployment, a 
fragmented society, the possibility of attacks from the Tamil diaspora, 
and poor economic conditions in the region and country.  
The first issue is the region’s weak governance and its history of a 
strong military presence. This problem was caused by the LTTE’s firm 
control over the region during the conflict. The government institutions 
in the Northern Province had been under the LTTE’s control, leading 
to a weakening of these institutions (Herath 2012, 26). The LTTE had 
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established its own judicial system, police, border patrol, and adminis-
tration in the Northern Province (ICG 2012a, 3). After the conflict, the 
Sri Lankan government struggled to revive the government institutions 
that the LTTE previously controlled; the effort has been proven dif-
ficult due to the infrastructure damage in the region. This vacuum of 
power allowed the military to become the alternative authority in the 
province. The military’s legitimacy is also further strengthened by the 
fact that they have been the most prominent actors in the fight against 
the LTTE.
The second problem pertained to the issue of refugees and war 
victims. The long-lasting conflict between the Sri Lankan government 
and the LTTE has displaced hundreds of thousands of people in the 
Northern Province. In May 2009, as many as 262,629 people had to 
leave the region (Keerawalla 2013, 6). This number does not account for 
the 75,000 Muslim population driven out of the region by the LTTE in 
1990 (ICG 2012a, 3). The following table details the number of refugees 
in the Northern Province in 2009: 
Table 1. Number of Refugees in the Northern Province, May 2009
No. Name of Shelter Place Families Men Women Total
1. Aruvithoddam 322 519 534 1,053
2. Ananda Cumaraswamy 39,671
3. Kadirgamar R.V. 5,863 10,523 10,538 21,061
4. Arunachalam R.V. (Zone 3) 14,318 19,985 20,663 40,648
5. Cheddikulam M.V. 543 872 897 1,769
6. Ramanathan R. V. (Zone 2) 80,584
7. Zone 4 35,400
8. Andiay Puliyankulam School 616 1,564
9. Pampaimadu Hostal 1,387 2,229 2,285 4,514
10. Nelulkulam Kalaimakal Vidyalaya 1,353 1,539 1,485 3,024
11. Saivaprakasa M. V. 1,262 1,578 1,741 3,320
12. Tamil M. V (Senior) 1,705 2,412 2,411 4,823
13. Vauniya Muslim M.V. 498 722 794 1,516
14. Gamini M. V. 818 859 1,008 1,867
15. Kovikulam M. V. 481 756 824 1,580
16. College of Education 1,970 2,978 3,125 6,103
17. Poonathottam M. V. 484 796 819 1,635
18. Tamil M. V. (Primary) 458 613 650 1,263
19. Kanthapuram Vani Vidyalaya 422 552 564 1,166
20. Thandikulam School 512 671 757 1,428
21. Puthukkulam School 807 1,855 1,365 3,220
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22. Velikkulam School 436 576 652 1,228
23. Komarasankulam M. V. 735 1,035 1,140 2,175
24. Samankulam Elders W. C. 103
Total 262,629
Source: Keerawella (2013).
The above table shows that there were 262,629 refugees from the North-
ern Province. Most of them were from Ramanathan R. V. (Zone 2), 
Ananda Cumaraswamy, and Zone 4, which covered and sheltered at 
the Menik Farm Shelter. The Menik Farm Shelter was built by the 
Sri Lankan government in 2009 on top of a 700-hectare area in the 
Vavuniya District, Northern Province, to accommodate refugees at the 
end of the conflict period (Perera 2012). The number of casualties dur-
ing the end of the conflict period was predicted to have reached 40,000 
people (ICG 2012a, 5).
The third problem is the region’s infrastructure damage and un-
employment. The military attacks in 2009 have caused the destruc-
tion of infrastructure in the province. The infrastructure damage has 
blocked people’s access to jobs. A USAID survey found that the major-
ity of families in the province had low income. Around 89% of the 
families reached by the survey did not have a regular source of income 
(ICG 2012b, 8). This issue led to poverty and debt. The World Food 
Programme stated that more than half the population in the North-
ern Province’s five districts lived below the poverty line (ICG 2012b, 
10). More than half the region’s population was also in massive debt, 
which amounted to the equivalent of six months’ worth of income (ICG 
2012b).
The fourth is the fragmented state of the society in the region. This 
problem was caused by the differing views among the three largest com-
munities in the Northern Province—the Tamil, Sinhalese, and Mus-
lims—regarding the government-LTTE conflict. Each group viewed 
themselves as the victims of the conflict and being on the right side. 
The situation was worsened because that there was a lack of effort from 
the Sri Lankan government to bridge these differing views among the 
three communities. Instead of going for a power-sharing scheme among 
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the three groups, the Sri Lankan government opted to deploy the mili-
tary to act as the authority in the region after the conflict. 
The fifth issue is the threat of attacks from the Tamil diaspora, 
who had been supporting the LTTE for decades; after the LTTE’s 
loss to the Sri Lankan military, they were still persistent in launching 
attacks. The LTTE was heavily reliant on the Tamil diaspora for logisti-
cal help, morale, and support to survive in a long period (Vimalarajah 
and Cheran 2010, 7). After the LTTE’s loss, the Tamil diaspora still 
staged protests in various countries, including India, Malaysia, United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, and Canada (Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010, 6). 
They have also set up the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam 
(TGTE) and the Global Tamil Forum (GTF), which aim to realize the 
Tamil’s rights to form an independent democratic government through 
democratic means (Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010, 30). 
The sixth is the poor economic condition in the Northern Prov-
ince—and Sri Lanka. The long conflict between the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment and the LTTE, coupled with the global crisis of 2008, have 
led Sri Lanka’s gross domestic income (GDI) to drop below 4% in 
2009 (Athukorala and Jayasuriya 2013, 18). This situation has forced 
President Rajapaksa to look for alternative solutions to revive Sri Lanka’s 
economic development. 
One of these solutions was the Mahinda Chintana program, which 
designated the Northern Province to generate income from the ser-
vice sector, particularly tourism and hospitality. For the past years, the 
Northern Province has been generating the least amount of GDI among 
the nine Sri Lankan provinces. In 2009, the province was only able to 
generate 3.3% or LKR 159 billion of Sri Lanka’s total GDI. The region’s 
income per capita only reached USD 1,185—far from the average na-
tional income per capita, which was at USD 2,053 (Government of Sri 
Lanka 2010). The Uthuru Wasanthaya development program was estab-
lished to accelerate the regional development of the Northern Province 
(Government of Sri Lanka 2010).
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The Militar y Prerogatives Dimension
The series of problems and the condition of the civilian rule in Sri Lan-
ka’s Northern Province served as justifications to involve the military 
in post-conflict non-combat operations, which involved the granting 
of prerogatives for the military. The Sri Lankan military gained greater 
authority through the establishment of the PTF, which was headed by 
the Minister of Economic Development, Basil Rajapaksa, the brother 
of President Rajapaksa. The PTF consisted of 19 people, including the 
Chief of the Defence Staff, the Commanders of the Armed Forces, and 
the Chief of Staff of the Army (Rajakarunanayake 2009). The PTF’s au-
thority was publicly known. However, there were no official state docu-
ments that specified the PTF’s mandate or discretions (Saparamadu and 
Lall 2014, 15). The military, through the PTF, was given prerogatives 
in the post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts, which 
included the administration and control of refugees, land expropriation 
and militarization, military businesses, and the monitoring of NGOs, 
the media, and activists. 
In matters relating to refugee administration and control, the mili-
tary took over many of the roles of the District Secretary and handled 
the administrational tasks in the Northern Province. The military, who 
was initially deployed to lend their support, ended up running the re-
gion’s administrational duties through the Security Forces Headquarters 
(SFHQ). The District Secretary authority over refugee management, 
oversight of the actors involved in the reconstruction and reconciliation 
programs, and provision of services and implementation of the devel-
opment programs in settlement areas became very limited due to the 
strong control of the PTF and military through the SFHQ (Saparamadu 
and Lall 2014, 15). The District Secretary lost the access to resources 
or finances from external parties, such as NGOs, without the PTF and 
military’s approval (Saparamadu and Lall 2014). The military was also 
involved in carrying out population censuses with the Department of 
Census and Statistics. The military carried out the population census 
on the number of victims after the clash between the military and the 
LTTE in 2009 (ICG 2012a, 6). 
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This large control over the population and refugee issues gave the 
military the power to tailor decision-making to their own interests. For 
example, the military prevented refugees from moving back to their 
homes. The lands that previously belonged to these refugees were expro-
priated and utilized for military interests, such as building camps and 
barracks. According to the Tamils, they even built houses for families 
of military personnel from outside of the Northern Province. The fol-
lowing table summarizes the list of expropriated areas in the province:
Table 2. List of Areas Expropriated by the Military in the Northern Province
District Expropriated Land/Area Purpose
Trincomalee






A variety of areas Military interests
A variety of areas, including 
Karachchi and Kandawalai
Military interests
Killinochchi Iranamadu SFHQOther Military interests
Mannar Mullikulam Navy baseSilavathurai Navy base
Jaffna Tellipalai High-Security Zones
Source: InterAction (2013).
The above table shows that the military has built camps and head-
quarters in Kilinochchi-Iranamadu, Mullaitivu District, and Mannar 
District. This takeover has prevented thousands of the Tamil population 
from returning to their homes and caused them to lose their income. 
Militarization was also carried out by setting up around 2,000 check-
points and assigning 10,000 soldiers in the Northern Province (ICG 
2012a, 9). The military often carried out random inspections on the 
people’s houses, causing the Tamil to fear for their safety. 
The military also carried out various economic activities in the re-
gion, such as farming, trading, and businesses in the service and tour-
ism sector. For example, the military utilized the people’s farmlands 
for their own farming, whose yields were then sold for the military’s 
own profit. The military also built hotels, shops, and restaurants. These 
shops and restaurants were built along the A9 main road of the province 
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(ICG 2012b, 23). The Thalsevana Holiday Resort in the Jaffna District 
is an example of this project (CNS/Ecosocialist Horizons 2014, 61). The 
Navy also provided ferry transport services while the Air Force opened 
commercial flights in the Jaffna District, Kilinochchi, and Vavuniya 
(ICG 2012b, 23).
As an institution with administrational authority, the military as-
serted strong control over donor agencies wishing to carry out humani-
tarian missions in the Northern Province. Any project proposed by an 
NGO or donors must be approved by the local military commander 
(ICG 2012b, 15). This condition allowed the military to only approve 
projects that are seen to bring them benefits (ICG 2012b). 
The military also often drove away NGOs or donors that were seen 
as being uncooperative. In the beginning of 2011, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was forced to leave the North-
ern Province (ICG 2011, 17). Several NGOs and donor agencies have 
complained about the slow procedure that must follow to obtain per-
mits from the military. This situation indicated an overlap between 
the authority of the civilian government and military (ICG 2011, 15). 
The military was able to monitor all the activities carried out by donor 
agencies and make decisions on what aid these organizations could 
provide to the people (ICG 2012b). This tight military control hindered 
the work of these organizations, including the United Nations’ (UN) 
project to channel aid to refugees. For example, the NGOs working for 
the Rural Development Societies (RDSs) and Women Rural Develop-
ment Societies (WRDSs) programs have had their work halted due to 
the military’s strong presence in the Northern Province (InterAction 
2013, 12). 
Furthermore, the military also intimidated and committed violence 
against people who were seen as political opposition to the central gov-
ernment in Colombo. The military detained people they perceived op-
posed to the military’s policies in the Northern Province. These arrests 
were made to respond the protests staged in front of the military camps 
in the region (BBC Sinhala 2011). In March 2011, a Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA) member of parliament, Sivagnanam Sritharan, was as-
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sassinated by a government agent (ICG 2011, 19). On the 16th June 2011, 
the military forcefully dispersed a TNA meeting in Alaveddy, an area in 
the Northern Province, using violence (ICG 2012a, 14). There was also 
intimidation towards the media. An editor of the Uthayan newspaper 
in the Jaffna District was gravely wounded by the military and rushed 
to the hospital (ICG 2012a). Foreign journalists were also not exempt 
from the military’s intimidation and pressure. Two European journalists 
were attacked and robbed in July 2011 in Jaffna before previously being 
warned to leave the province by the military (ICG 2012a). 
The Militar y Contestation Dimension
The extent of military prerogatives in various sectors was coupled 
with low levels of military contestation. According to Stepan (1998, 
100–118), the three vital issues that influence the degree of military 
contestation and civilian rule are 1) the legacy of human rights abuse; 
2) the military budget; and 3) the military’s mission, organization, and 
structure, and the civilian government’s control over the military. In 
the Northern Province, the military contestation dimension was low 
because the region did not experience open contestation between the 
military’s interest and the civilian government’s policies. Conversely, 
the civilian authority had similar perspectives to those of the military 
regarding the conduct of reconstruction and reconciliation after the 
government-LTTE conflict.
In regard to human rights abuse, the Sri Lankan government seemed 
to shield the military by not showing any effort to investigate the war 
crimes committed by the military during and after the conflict. The 
Sri Lankan government formed the Lessons Learned and Reconcili-
ation Commission (LLRC), whose duty was to improve people’s lives 
after the conflict by responding to the people’s needs and restoring 
civil and political rights, as well as other rights (Saparamadu and Lall 
2014, 8). However, the LLRC was not granted the authority to influence 
decision-making, which constrained their work in investigating and tak-
ing actions on the human rights violations committed by the military. 
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The LLRC was only able to recommend policies; discretions were 
up to President Rajapaksa. The president has not responded to the find-
ings of the LLRC on the war crimes that the military has committed. 
At the same time, the LLRC itself struggled with internal conflicts, 
which impacted its role in maintaining accountability and taking part 
in the reconciliation process (ICG 2011, 22). The limited capacity of the 
LLRC has invited criticism by the international community.  The body 
is considered to be less accountable, does not have the mandate to carry 
out prosecutions, does not have a witness protection program, and lacks 
impartiality, shown by its members’ conflict of interests of (ICG 2011). 
On the military budget, the Sri Lankan government and the military 
did not have significant differences. Instead, the government supported 
the military’s development and increase in its budget to cover war ex-
penses. This can be observed from the military budget’s growth, from 
USD 40 million or 1.5% of the gross national product (GNP) in 1978 
to USD 215 million or 3.5% of the GNP in 1985 (de Silva 2001, 13). In 
1987, the military budget reached 16.8% of the GNP (de Silva 2001). 
This number continued to rise as the conflict between the Sri Lankan 
government and the LTTE spread. This budget was utilized to recruit 
military personnel and modernize weaponry and equipment. 
After the conflict, the budget of the military continued to rise. In 
2011, the number reached USD 1.7 billion, from USD 1.5 billion in 
the previous year (Index Mundi n.d.). In 2013, the budget was increased 
again to USD 1.95 billion (Gulf Times 2013). The Sri Lankan govern-
ment claimed that the increase of the military budget was used to pur-
chase the weaponry needed to fight against the LTTE, fund the armed 
forces’ development, and prevent the LTTE’s resurgence (Gunadasa 
2011).  
The civilian government and the military also did not have stark dif-
ferences in views about the military’s mission, organization, structure, 
and the civilian authority’s control over the military. The Sri Lankan 
military has been professionalized and has not shown any tendency to 
subvert the authority of the civilian government since the 1960s. When 
the war against the LTTE ended, there were demands from the people 
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for the lessening of the military’s presence in the region. However, this 
request was only possible when the threat of resurgence is completely 
diminished (Gunadasa 2011)—this threat never really disappeared from 
the region, as the Tamil diaspora movement was still at large. Further-
more, the post-conflict military was given a mission to take part in the 
reconstruction and reconciliation mission in the Northern Province. 
The military not only played a role in carrying out administrational af-
fairs and reconstruction process, but also providing training for former 
LTTE members and social welfare for the community.
In executing its administrative tasks, the military told the SFHQ to 
work in parallel with the District Secretary (ICG 2012b, 15). The SFHQ 
was led by a major general whose authority covered the entire district in 
the Northern Province, where every camp has consisted of different di-
visions and units. Each division within the SFHQ was led by a brigadier 
or colonel (ICG 2012b).  Prior to the presence of the PTF, the District 
Secretary was responsible for the affairs relating to refugees, transmi-
grants, and social provision in the Northern Province (Supramadu and 
Lall 2014, 10). Formally, these affairs were convened by the Ministry of 
Transmigration and Resettlement Authority. The presence of the PTF 
created a dualism of authority within the administrational affairs of the 
Northern Province, rendering the District Secretary subordinate to the 
PTF’s supervision (Supramadu and Lall 2014, 15). 
Through the SFHQ, the military helped run daily administrative 
affairs in the villages (Rajapaksa 2012). The military was also involved 
in refugee management and identifying former LTTE fighters who had 
blended in with the refugees. In the first three months of the recon-
struction and reconciliation program, the military was able to identify 
3,000 former LTTE members among the refugees and separated them 
(Herath 2014, 44). 
As part of the reconstruction program, the military built central 
refugee shelters, carried out demining, and built housing estates. For 
example, Division 65 of the Sri Lankan army built 22 out of the 100 
houses targeted for refugees in the Akkarayankulam region in 2012 (Sri 
163UNEQUAL CIVILIAN ACCOMMODATION WITHIN DEMOCRATIC RULE
Lanka Army n.d-a). The military was deemed able to save LKR 3.7 bil-
lion of the budget for infrastructure development (Sunday Leader 2012). 
In providing training for former LTTE members, the military en-
acted several programs. These programs included skills training as 
well as spiritual assistance and meditation program (Herath 2012, 45). 
The military also held education programs for former LTTE members’ 
children and provided opportunities for them to take school exams 
(Karunaratne 2014, 104). In terms of social welfare, the military lent 
ambulances and helicopters to evacuate wounded civilians to the hos-
pitals in Vavuniya, Anuradapura, and Trincomalee Districts (Hearth 
2012, 42). They also made donations, held training for medical workers, 
education seminars, sports events, religious festivals, and enacted tree-
planting campaigns. Moreover, the military returned around 150,000 
lost cattle to their owners (Hearth 2012, 47–48). 
In policymaking, President Rajapaksa appointed several military 
personnel and veterans to fill in strategic positions, such as guberna-
torial and ambassadorial positions as well as positions on the board 
of state-owned enterprises (Heryadi 2014, 66). The following are the 
names of military personnel appointed to civilian posts during President 
Rajapaksa’s rule:
Table 3. Names of Military Personnel Appointed to Civilian Posts
Name Position
Mohan Wijewickrama Eastern Province Governor
G. A. Chandrasiri Northern Province Governor
Thisara Samarasinghe Sri Lankan High Commissioner for Australia
Sarath Dissanayake Ambassador for Cuba
Wassantha Karanagoda Ambassador for Japan
Jayalath Weerakody Ambassador for Pakistan
Santha Kossegoda Ambassador for Thailand
Gotabaya Rajapaksa Minister of Defence and City Development
Nanda Mallawaarachchi Secretary of the Ministry of Legal Affairs
M.R.S.P. Samarasinghe Manager of Ceylon Petroleum Corporation
Source: Heryadi (2014).
The appointment of military personnel and veterans to administrational 
and ambassadorial posts was seen as a move to maintain the profes-
sionalism of the military (Herath 2012, 66). President Rajapaksa’s close 
relationship with the military was also evident from the Sri Lankan 
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government’s support for the military’s programs to further profession-
alize the military. These schemes included the establishment of the 
Army Training Command (ARTRAC) and Officers’ Career Develop-
ment Center (OCDC). These two facilities served as training avenues 
for the military to fulfil international professional military standards 
(Sri Lanka Army n.d-b). 
Analysis of Civil-Militar y Relationship in Sri Lanka’s 
Northern Province: Unequal Civilian Accommodation
According to Stepan (1998, 135), low levels of military contestation and 
high levels of military prerogatives lead to the unequal civilian accom-
modation type of civil-military relationship. A nation-state in such a 
position is fragile due to the military’s sense of legitimacy provided by 
the substantial levels of their prerogatives. Decision-making processes 
are thus likely to become very conflictual. Militaries with strong sup-
port from their allies within the civil and political society are capable 
of using their prerogatives to impose their policies onto the democratic 
regime which they are likely to accept to avoid a possible coup (Stepan 
1998, 135).
The unequal civilian accommodation relationship was visible in 
the case of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. As the holder of the highest 
authority, the military—with its authority over the reconstruction and 
reconciliation programs in the Northern Province—saw itself as being 
in possession of excessive prerogatives. The military felt that it had the 
legitimacy to assert control over administrational and refugee-related 
affairs, expropriate lands and carry out militarization strategies, run 
military businesses, and control the activities of NGOs, activists, and 
the media. 
This situation was due to the unstable state of the Northern Prov-
ince, shown by the still suboptimal condition of civilian rule in the 
province. The province was still facing crises after the conflict ended, 
such as issues of refugees and victims of war, infrastructural damage, 
unemployment, a fragmented society, the threat of resurgence from 
the Tamil diaspora, and the poor economic conditions in the Northern 
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Province. In times of a high social and economic crisis, the military was 
able to take over the chain of command, either through the demands 
of the people or its own accord (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2005, 13). 
The consequence of an unequal civilian accommodation condition 
is the military takeover of the civilian government’s authority over the 
decision-making process. For instance, the military in the Northern 
Province was able to take over the role of the District Secretary in ad-
ministrational affairs, carry out population census, control the influx 
of refugees and monitor the activities of NGOs and state employees in 
the region. The military used its authority to impose decisions that the 
civilian government must accept. An example of this was the military’s 
involvement in meetings that were supposed to be led by the civilian 
government and its steering of the meetings to produce policies in favor 
of the military’s interests.  
The involvement of the military in civilian or internal affairs is nor-
mally unfavored as it strengthens the prerogatives of the military and 
gives them larger autonomy than that of the civilian government, paving 
the way for the military’s further immersion in political processes—
particularly policymaking—and increasing the risk of human rights 
abuse by the military (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2005, 7). In the case 
of the Northern Province, these three consequences occurred due to 
the relationship of unequal civilian accommodation. In addition to the 
military’s domination over and ability to insert itself in the administra-
tional affairs of the Northern Province, high levels of military preroga-
tives within land management and the running of military businesses 
have also placed the Tamil in a major disadvantage. This problem was 
also evident in terms of the military’s surveillance over refugees, activ-
ists, journalists, and NGOs, which facilitated intimidation and violent 
conduct against those deemed to oppose the military. 
The Sri Lankan government itself did not take action against the 
military’s discretions and violations. Although on paper, the military’s 
role within the reconstruction and reconciliation programs was under 
the authority of the civilian government, the military had the freedom 
to make discretions that favored them. The findings of the LLRC con-
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firmed this, stating that the Sri Lankan government has largely ignored 
the military’s violations.
The above analysis, which draws upon Stepan’s (1998) framework, 
corresponds to the four-quadrants framework posited by Pion-Berlin 
and Trinkunas (2005). The case of the Northern Province showed that 
the region was faced with high levels of crisis and weak civilian rule. 
The crisis dimension can be seen from the ongoing reconciliation and 
reconstruction processes and the persisting threat of resurgence by the 
Tamil diaspora. The weak civilian control dimension was indicated by 
the still suboptimal governance in the region, particularly in terms of 
refugee management and accommodation of victims of war, infrastruc-
tural damage, the fragmented state of the society, and poor economic 
conditions. The weakness of the civilian rule was also reflected in the 
lack of government responses against the human rights violations found 
and reported by the LLRC (ICG 2011, 22). 
The combination of the high levels of crisis and weak civilian con-
trol resulted in the military’s expansive domestic role and intervention. 
This was shown by the substantial levels of military prerogatives, which 
led to an unequal civilian accommodation, as argued by Stepan (1998). 
The military intervention and extensive immersion in political affairs 
were made possible by the vacuum of power, support of political elites, 
as well as ongoing conflict (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2005, 13). These 
three conditions were present in the case of the Northern Province. The 
military involvement in the province to support the reconstruction and 
reconciliation efforts through the PTF was strongly supported by Presi-
dent Rajapaksa. The president himself maintained a close relationship 
with the military and granted several strategic government posts to the 
military higher-ups and veterans. Although the conflict between the 
LTTE and the Sri Lankan government has subsided, the threat of the 
Tamil diaspora striking back during the reconstruction and reconcilia-
tion remains a looming possibility. 
An unequal civilian accommodation type of civil-military relation-
ship could be a middle way towards a more democratic system (Cole 
1992, 21). The Sri Lankan military has a sizable number of active-duty 
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personnel, particularly in the Northern Province. To justify this large 
capacity, the military was granted extensive authority and permission 
to carry out military business activities during the reconstruction and 
reconciliation process. This served as a middle way for the military to 
exercise their autonomy while the Sri Lankan civilian government ben-
efited from their involvement in internal affairs to meet development 
targets without having to give up the democratic form of government 
to authoritarian rule. 
CONCLUSION
This study seeks to explain the civil-military relationship, particularly 
the unequal civilian accommodation kind, in Sri Lanka’s Northern 
Province after the government-LTTE conflict. This study shows that 
the unequal civilian accommodation type of civil-military relationship 
in the region occurred as a result of a low level of military contestation 
and high military prerogatives. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas’ framework 
further facilitates our analysis and shows that this type of civil-military 
relationship came about due to high levels of crisis and weak civilian 
rule in the region. This combination allowed room for the military to 
dominate and intervene in internal affairs. This form of civil-military 
relationship was heavily shaped by the post-conflict context of the 
Northern Province, as it gave legitimacy for the military to enter the 
realm of civilian rule. 
The involvement of the military in the reconstruction and reconcili-
ation programs in the Northern Province after the government-LTTE 
conflict was a form of non-combat military operation in times of crisis. 
Despite the unequal civilian accommodation in the Northern Prov-
ince’s case, such a relationship did not impact the civilian government’s 
capacity to govern in general. This is because this type of relationship 
was viewed as a middle way for the Sri Lankan democratic government 
to share its powers and normalize the large capacity of the military 
personnel in the Northern Province. 
The civil-military relationship formed in the Northern Province pro-
vides further insight into military immersion in civilian affairs during a 
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crisis. Without strong control and oversight, the military’s involvement 
in domestic non-combat missions allows the military the freedom to 
carry out their missions following their own interests (Pion-Berlin and 
Trinkunas 2005, 7). Consequently, the formulation and implementation 
of policies become conflictual, compromise the authority of the civilian 
government, and hurt the people on the ground. 
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